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Abstract. Quine’s classic interpretation succinctly characterized Carnap’s Aufbau as an 
attempt “to account for the external world as a logical construct of sense-data ... .” 
Consequently, “Russell” was characterized as the most important influence on the 
Aufbau. Those times have passed. Formulating a comprehensive and balanced inter-
pretation of the Aufbau has turned out to be a difficult task and one that must take 
into account several disjointed sources.   
My thesis is that the core of the Aufbau rested on a problem that had haunted German 
philosophy since the end of the 19th century. In terms fashionable at the time, this 
problem may be expressed as the polarity between Leben and Geist that characterized 
German philosophy during the years of the Weimar Republic. At that time, many 
philosophers, including Cassirer, Rickert and Vaihinger, were engaged in overcoming this 
polarity. As I will show, Carnap’s Aufbau joined the ranks of these projects. This 
suggests that Lebensphilosophie and Rickert’s System der Philosophie (1921) 
(henceforth System) exerted a strong influence on Carnap’s projects, an influence that 
is particularly conspicuous in his unpublished manuscript Vom Chaos zur Wirklichkeit 
(1922). Carnap himself asserted that this manuscript could be considered “the germ of 
the constitution theory” of the Aufbau. Reading Chaos also reveals another strong but 
neglected influence on the Aufbau, namely a specific version of neutral monism put 
forward by the philosopher and psychologist Theodor Ziehen before World War I. 
Ziehen’s work contributed much to the invention of the constitutional method of quasi-
analysis. 
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I . Introduction 
 
The Aufbau was once described as an attempt “to account for the external world as a 
logical construct of sense-data” (Quine 1969, 74). Consequently, the most important 
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influence on the Aufbau could be precisely named as “Russell”. Those times have 
passed. The task of providing a balanced and comprehensive interpretation of the 
Aufbau has turned out to be more difficult than most people imagined forty years ago, 
when Quine’s interpretation of the Aufbau was popular.  
It is my thesis that the original core of the Aufbau project rested on a problem that 
had haunted German philosophy since the end of the 19th century. In terms fashio-
nable at the time, the problem was characterized as a polarity between Leben and 
Geist (Life and Spirit). It became particularly acute in the turbulent years of the Weimar 
Republic, when neo-Kantianism, still arguably the leading current of academic 
philosophy in Germany at the time, came under heavy fire from various currents of  
Lebensphilosophie (philosophy of life) and related philosophical currents such as 
Heidegger’s fundamental ontology.1 
Carnap, one of the younger and more ambitious philosophers of the time, was also 
engaged in the project of overcoming the conflict between Leben and Geist. His 
attempts were characterized by a certain eclecticism; he frequently used conceptual 
devices and ideas from very different currents of science and philosophy. This 
eclecticism makes it difficult to identify the influences that contributed to the Aufbau. 
The aim of this paper is to draw attention to three influences that have been neglected 
in the literature: Lebensphilosophie, South-West neo-Kantianism, and a specific version 
of Machian monism as presented by the German philosopher and psychologist Theodor 
Ziehen in his Erkenntnistheorie auf psychophysiologischer und physikalischer Grundlage 
(Ziehen (1913), henceforth Erkenntnistheorie).  
At first glance, these influences form a strange triad. Even if one were to admit that 
they had some influence on the Aufbau, it is not clear what brings them together. The 
answer is that all three theories are essential ingredients in the unpublished manuscript 
Vom Chaos zur Welt (Carnap 1922, RC 081–05-0, henceforth Chaos), which was, 
according to Carnap, the “germ of the Aufbau”, or as I contend, Chaos may be 
characterized as the “Ur-Aufbau”. The general thesis of this paper is that bringing into 
focus the triad of Lebensphilosophie, South-West neo-Kantianism, and monism á la 
Ziehen sheds new light on the meaning of Carnap’s first opus magnum.  
At that time, the situation in German philosophy might be described as a quarrel 
between academic, broadly scientific-minded philosophy on the one hand and more or 
                                                
1 A succinct presentation of the philosophical landscape in Germany in the 1920s can be found in 
Schnädelbach (1984). 
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less irrationalist currents such as Lebensphilosophie on the other. More precisely, the 
academic philosophy sought to confine the effect of the growing tide of Lebensphilo-
sophie on the cultural and intellectual scene in Germany.2 
While Lebensphilosophie tended to assume an unbridgeable gap between Leben and 
Geist, most currents of established academic philosophy were prepared to recognize a 
relative independence and autonomy for the sphere of Leben. As discussed below, 
academic philosophers generally sought a reconciliation of Geist and Leben in a world in 
which both had a legitimate place.   
Among the philosophers engaged in overcoming the antagonism between Geist and 
Leben were Cassirer (Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, 1923 - 1929), Rickert 
(System, 1921), Vaihinger (Die Philosophie des Als Ob. Ein System der theoretischen, 
praktischen, und religiösen Fiktionen der Menschheit, 19206), and Husserl (The Crisis of 
European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936) and earlier lectures).  
Carnap was aware of many of these works. It would not be unjustified to ascribe to his 
early work a certain eclecticism, as the exegetic work of several authors has revealed, 
Carnap used arguments from many different philosophical quarters. I will argue that this 
eclecticism was held together by the underlying aim of overcoming the antagonism 
between Leben and Geist.  
The Aufbau project covered an extended period, from approximately 1922 to 1930.3 It 
can hardly be expected that Carnap’s philosophical convictions would remain constant 
throughout this entire period. I contend that in the early Aufbau project, Carnap sought 
a harmonious reconciliation of “Geist” and “Leben” in a meaningful world in which both 
                                                
2 An impressive account of the fascination that Heidegger’s lectures exerted on the German 
academic youth at that time is given by Hannah Arendt: “[His] name travelled all over Germany 
like the rumour of a secret king. [...] The rumour that attracted [the students] first to Freiburg 
to the Privatdozent and somewhat later to Marburg, told that there was one who really achieved 
the thing that Husserl had proclaimed” (Arendt (1969, 893). The tone of many comments about 
Heidegger’s performance at the “Davoser Disputation“ is similar. Many hailed him as the prophet 
of a new (philosophical) age. This prediction was fulfilled a few years later, but perhaps not in the 
way that many had hoped for (cf. Gordon (2010), Wolin (2001, 2006)). 
3 This claim may need some explanation. After all, the Aufbau was published in 1928, and one 
may assert that the story ends there. however, the tentative date of 1930 is given to assert 
that for a short time after 1928, the Aufbau was still a living option among the members of the 
Vienna Circle. Indeed, the Manifesto claimed that the Aufbau would play the role of a formal 
frame of Einheitswissenschaft to be carried out in the future (cf. Manifesto, , Frank 1956).   
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had a legitimate place. Over time, however, the project retreated to the more modest 
goal of providing a rational reconstruction of scientific knowledge, neatly separated 
from the realm of Leben, that allowed for the peaceful co-existence of Leben and Geist. 
The two realms nevertheless remained related to each other in some manner, as 
expressed in the enigmatic closing phrase of the Manifesto: “The scientific world con-
ception serves life and life receives it” (cf. Mormann (2013)). 
The outline of this paper is as follows. In section 2, the global situation of German 
philosophy in the Weimar Republic is characterized in broad terms as a polarized 
spectrum that ranged from scientifically oriented (neo-Kantian) philosophy to a group 
of loosely defined irrationalist, anti-scientific philosophical currents that may be 
subsumed under the heading of Lebensphilosophie. For the purposes of this paper , I 
include various authors such as Bergson, Scheler, Spengler, Nietzsche, Simmel, Dilthey, 
and even Heidegger may be subsumed under this imprecise philosophical heading. For 
these thinkers   in a rather woolly sense, Leben – in a not purely biological sense - was 
the primary and even the only important topic of philosophy in a way that transcended 
the purely biological sense.   
When it emerged, most academic philosophy ignored Lebensphilosophie and its growing 
influence on the cultural and intellectual life of Germany. Eventually, however, it 
became clear that this stance was no longer tenable. Academic philosophy was forced 
to adopt a definitive attitude towards Lebensphilosophie that went beyond disregard or 
refusal.   
For Carnap, one particularly important attempt to address the problem of Leben was 
put forward by the South-West neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert in his two books Die 
Philosophie des Lebens (Rickert 1920) and System (Rickert 1921). In these books, 
Rickert attempted a partial integration of Lebensphilosophie into a comprehensive sys-
tem of scientific-minded philosophy. Whether Rickert was successful is up for debate 
(cf. Kusch 1995), but Rickert was important to Carnap’s Aufbau project.  
As section 3 demonstrates, an early version of the Aufbau project has interesting 
affinities with Rickert’s project. Indeed, there are striking similarities between Rickert’s 
System (1921) and Carnap’s Chaos For instance, both conceptualize the “Aufbau” of 
an ordered rational world as emerging from a “chaos of Erlebnisse” and both describe 
the motif for such an “Aufbau” as a pseudo-Nietzschean “will to order” or “will to 
system”.  
In the Aufbau project, Carnap also attempted to integrate central claims of 
Lebensphilosophie into what the Manifesto later called a comprehensive “scientific 
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world conception”. In Chaos, Carnap addressed a challenge similar to the one Rickert 
confronted in System: to bring about a reconciliation of Geist and Leben. In other 
words, both sought to construct an ordered and rational world (kosmos) from an 
original chaos of Erlebnisse.  
It goes without saying that the details of Rickert’s and Carnap’s projects are very dif-
ferent. Indeed, Chaos can be characterized as an attempt to synthesize a range of 
theories: Rickert’s neo-Kantian account, a specific version of Machian neutral monism 
as presented by Ziehen in his Erkenntnistheorie auf physiopsychologischer und 
physikalischer Grundlage (Ziehen 1913), certain requirements of Lebensphilosophie, 
and the conceptual tools of relational logic inaugurated by Russell and Whitehead.4 
What exactly this means will be clarified in the following sections.   
In the longer, unpublished version of his Intellectual Autobiography Carnap characteri-
zed Chaos as “the germ of the Aufbau”. He noted that in Chaos he formulated, for the 
first time, the constitutional method of “quasi-analysis” which played an essential role 
in the constitution theory überhaupt. This claim is in need of qualification. As shown in 
section 3, the essential ingredients for this theory can already be found in Ziehen’s 
Erkenntnistheorie.  
Section 4 contains further evidence that Rickert’s Wertphilosophie had a considerable 
influence on the Aufbau project. I argue that, much like Rickert, the Aufbau was en-
gaged in the constitution of values and other cultural objects. Indeed, Carnap pointed 
out that the basic constitutional method of quasi-analysis may be characterized as a 
kind of valuation as it was practiced in Rickert’s Wertphilosophie. On the other hand, 
from a formal perspective the method of quasi-analysis can be conceived as a defining 
and clarifying of Ziehen’s “Koinadenprinzip”. Chaos can therefore be seen as a synthesis 
of Rickert’s voluntarism, Ziehen’s positivistic monism, and Lebensphilosophie. 
 
I I . Weimar Polarity. 
 
Near the end of the Weimar Republic, one of its most influential philosophers and public 
intellectuals, Ernst Cassirer, offered the following diagnosis of the situation of 
philosophy in Germany:    
 
                                                
4 Ziehen was the psychiatrist who took care of Nietzsche after he had a mental breakdown in 
1889 and was admitted to psychiatric care.   
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Again, it has become evident how strong our „“modern”“ and most modern 
philosophical thoughts are rooted in romanticism and how they depend, 
consciously or unconsciously, on romanticist patterns. Again, the great 
anti-thesis of Natur and Geist, the polarity of Leben and Erkenntnis occupy 
center-stage in philosophical considerations5 – and still the conceptual tools 
forged by romanticism, and the categories created by this period determine 
the problem and its solution. (Cassirer (1930, 186))6 
  
Cassirer noted that there are several ways to address this polarity. One was to dissolve 
it in favor of a unipolar approach. As paradigmatic examples of similarly one-sided 
strategies he considered, on the one hand, the irrationalist version of 
Lebensphilosophie put forward by Ludwig Klages in his monumental Der Geist als 
Widersacher der Seele (Klages (1929 – 1933, app. 1500 pages) and the radically 
physicalist versions of logical empiricism espoused by the Vienna Circle, on the other 
hand. While Klages considered Geist to be the deadly enemy of Leben, the logical 
empiricists considered everything that could not be expressed in physicalist language 
to be metaphysical nonsense.   
In addition to these radical and one-sided proposals of overcoming the fundamental 
polarity, Cassirer took into consideration a quite different class of proposals, namely 
those that intended to bring about a reconciliation between Leben and Geist. It is not 
difficult to see that Cassirer favored such a solution when he put forward the rhetorical 
question:  
 
Romanticism versus positivism; “reason and science” versus the opposition 
to both, even their contempt, mysticism vs. “physicalism” – this is the 
whole theme of the philosophy of the last 150 years (1781 – 1931). Do we 
have to subscribe to one of these alternatives – or is there a kind of 
“reconciliation” that is principally different from an eclectic mixture of these 
two ingredients? (Cassirer 1995, 131) 
 
The spectacular culmination of this confrontation between Lebensphilosophie and 
                                                
5 Unwittingly, Carnap became a witness for the correctness of Cassirer’s diagnosis as demon-
strated by the fact that, some years later, Carnap published in the journal Natur und Geist (sic) 
the paper Theoretische Fragen und praktische Entscheidungen (Carnap 1934). 
6 Similar ideas also appeared in Husserl’s lectures on Natur und Geist that he gave in 1919 and 
1927.    
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academic philosophy was the famous “Davos Disputation” of Heidegger and Cassirer in 
Davos (Switzerland) in 1929 (see for example Gründer (1988), Friedman (1999), 
Gordon (2011), Skidelsky (2008)). Many contemporary witnesses considered the 
encounter between Heidegger and Cassirer to be a major philosophical event, which 
amounted to a philosophical sea-change and defined a new philosophical era. The 
general impression was that Heidegger, representing the new way of doing philosophy, 
was the winner in the Davos showdown, although I do not discuss the assertion here. 
For the purposes of this paper, it is important only to note that Carnap also 
participated in the Davos event and had discussions with both Heidegger and Cassirer 
(cf. Friedman (1999), Gordon (2010)). This suggests that he was vividly interested in 
the fundamental antagonism between the two currents that characterized philosophy in 
German-speaking countries and beyond at the time and that he was at pains to find his 
own stance in this dispute and overcome the aporetic controversy.  
In this respect, he was one of the many philosophers of the time who were engaged in 
overcoming the aporetic polarity between irrational Leben and rational Geist. Many of 
them tackled this problem from a developmental perspective in which the problem was 
how from a basic stratum of Leben higher strata of reason and knowledge could be 
built up compatible with Leben. This brought into play the concept of construction or 
constitution, i.e., how the categories of reason or rationality could be constituted from 
more elementary categories of Leben. With respect to this issue I would like to put 
forward the following thesis:  
 
The Aufbau was Carnap’s proposal of how the polarity between Geist and 
Leben could be conceptualized in a fruitful way. Carnap’s solution was of a 
reconciliatory nature: Geist was neither the “enemy of life” nor could life be 
completely subordinated to Geist.  
 
As discussed above, such a project was far from original in the 1920s. Many currents 
of academic philosophy in Germany were engaged in analogous projects of coming to 
terms with Leben. For example, the Baden school of neo-Kantianism, in particular 
Rickert; the Marburg neo-Kantianism, with Cassirer’s “philosophy of symbolic forms“; 
and Husserlian phenomenology. My thesis argues that the Aufbau project was 
essentially informed by the specific constellation of German philosophy, culture, and 
politics in existence during the Weimar Republic.  
This contention is far from new. Twenty years ago, Peter Galison noted that the 
specific historical situation of Weimar period was an core influence on the Aufbau’s 
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philosophical content. He argued, convincingly, that the “Der logische Aufbau der Welt” 
is not adequately translated as “The Logical Construction of the World”.  
A more recent attempt to embed Carnap’s work in a specific historical and cultural con-
text is the work of Gottfried Gabriel. (cf. Gabriel (2003, 2004)). According to Gabriel: 
 
Carnap’s early philosophy … can be regarded as a configuration of 
influences – a cross-fertilization of modern logic, neo-Kantian constitution 
theory, and the critique of metaphysics stemming from Lebensphilosophie – 
highly specific to a particular time and place: Jena in the first two decades 
of the twentieth century, when Carnap grew up and went to university 
there. (Gabriel (2004, 6) 
 
Gabriel’s description of the cultural context from which Carnap’s early philosophy 
emerged points to some interesting ingredients that have been neglected in the past. 
Regrettably, he addresses the Aufbau only in passing and I would not place as strong 
an accent on “Jena” as he does. Rather, I contend that overcoming the aporetic 
antagonism between Lebensphilosophie and scientifically minded philosophy (in a broad 
sense) was not a special problem of the Jena philosophical configuration but an urgent 
problem for the entire field of academic philosophy in the Weimar Republic.  
Instead of focusing on the concept of “Aufbau”, as Galison did, I will concentrate on the 
concepts Erlebnis and Chaos, which point rather directly to the strong influence of 
Lebensphilosophie on Carnap’s thinking. To set the stage, one should keep in mind that 
Carnap spent his philosophical apprenticeship in a philosophical arena somewhat alien to 
his later philosophical company. At the time, he studied under the influence of the 
South-West school of neo-Kantianism, beginning with Bruno Bauch in Jena, continuing 
with Rickert in Freiburg, and returning to Bauch and Frege in Jena. This influence 
continued well into the 1920s and is still visible in the Aufbau project, especially in its 
early stages. Later, in the second half of the 1920s, Rickert fell out of favor with 
Carnap, although it is not clear why. One plausible explanation would be the growing 
anti-neo-Kantian influence of the Vienna Circle, in particular the influence of Neurath, to 
which Carnap was exposed. 
Carnap’s attack in Overcoming Metaphysics on Wertphilosophie was clearly directed 
against both Rickert and Heidegger. Eventually, in Carnap’s later Intellectual Auto-
biography (Carnap 1963), Rickert was implicitly deemed philosophically irrelevant; he 
was not mentioned at all.  However, let us return for a moment to when Carnap 
appears to have held Rickert’s philosophy in higher esteem, namely immediately after 
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Rickert published System (Rickert 1920) and Philosophie des Lebens (1921)7. In these 
works, Rickert not only outlined his own philosophical system but also attempted to 
come to terms with Lebensphilosophie. He recognized the philosophical importance of 
the topic of Leben in general and of Erlebnis in particular:      
 
Every systematic thought seeks to begin with something immediately given 
which does not permit any further derivation. Using a word fashionable 
today, this immediately given is called “the experience” (“das Erlebnis”). 
This need not to be objected. (System, 311).   
 
Carnap’s argument for choosing Erlebnisse as the basic elements of the constitutional 
system in the Aufbau was virtually identical to Rickert’s:   
 
... [S]ince we wish to require of our constructional system that it should 
agree with the epistemic order of the objects (§54), we have to proceed 
from that which is epistemically primary, that is to say, from the “given”, 
i.e., from Erlebnisse themselves in their totality and undivided unity. 
(Aufbau, § 67) 
 
Rickert’s assertion that he “didn’t object” to calling “the given” “Erlebnis” was, he 
hoped, a clever attempt to bring Leben - conceived of as a “stream of Erlebnisse” - 
back under the control of scientific philosophy. For this endeavor, he sought help from 
Nietzsche, who may be considered a strange ally because he was one of the 
protagonists of Lebensphilosophie. According to Rickert, in the realm of philosophy, the 
Nietzschean “will to power” expresses itself as a “will to the system”: 
 
What we immediately “experience” (“erleben”), is, after having subtracted 
all conceptualizations a completely disordered turmoil of impressions that 
constantly change [...]. For a scientifically minded individual, the world, 
thought as totally unsystematic, is a ... chaos. Most people do not realize 
this fully due the fact that from birth on we encroach in a stable organi-
zation of the world (Rickert 1920, 6/7) 
                                                
7 The full title of Rickert’s book reads Die Philosophie des Lebens. Darstellung und Kritik der philo-
sophischen Modeströmungen unserer Zeit. This title sounds more dismissive with respect to 
Lebensphilosophie than the book really is. To a rather large extent, Rickert offered a knowledg-
eable and not unfair presentation of Lebensphilosophie.  
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... 
Hence, the will for the philosophical consideration of the world is necessarily 
connected with the will to the system. (ibid. 10) (my emphasis, TM) 
... 
Philosophy has to think the world in such a way that from the chaos of 
Erlebnisse a kosmos arises that is ordered and articulated by principles 
(ibid., 50). 
  
Like Rickert, Carnap assumed, in Chaos, that the “chaos” from which the fictitious 
Aufbau of Wirklichkeit was to emerge was minimally structured so that the “will to 
order” had a base from which to begin the construction process: 
 
The chaos does not contain identical elements that can be grasped as iso-
lated ones. In order that the chaos can be ordered at all, there must never-
theless exist differences in it on which it depends which places of the 
ordering schema are related to which parts of the chaos.   
… 
We ascribe to the chaos as few basic differences as possible, namely, only 
as many as are necessary for the constitution of reality. (Chaos, p.2)  
  
Compared with Rickert, however, Carnap was much more explicit about what this 
minimal structure of “chaos” had to look like to permit the construction of a higher 
strata of Wirklichkeit. This is where Ziehen’s Erkenntnistheorie enters the stage. Carnap 
adopted the basic formal structure that was assumed by the system of Erlebnisse to 
get the constitution process started in Ziehen’s monistic account (cf. Ziehen 1913). 
This process will be discussed in detail in the next section.  
Both Rickert and Carnap sought to design a constitution theory that could be used as a 
frame for constructing an ordered and meaningful world that retained at least some of 
the features characteristic of the world propagated by philosophers of Lebens. (“The 
scientific world conception serves life and life receives it”.) In the Aufbau project, 
Carnap sketched the constitution of a meaningful world in which values and other 
“cultural objects” played an essential role.   
The origins for the constitution of such a comprehensive world can already be found in 
the Uraufbau, or the Chaos manuscript. In Chaos, Carnap responded to the challenge of 
Lebensphilosophie: that concepts such as intellect, conceptualization, reason, and 
rationalization were “dead” or, even worse, devices for “killing life” via ingenious 
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trickery. According to Carnap, Erlebnisse, as parts of Leben or, alternatively, Leben as a 
stream of Erlebnisse (Erlebnisstrom), had “living” and “dead” components. He 
stipulated that, for every Erlebnis there is: 
 
… a first basic difference, namely that what we call the living and the dead 
part of the Erlebnis. … The living part means what later is called sensation, 
and the dead part means representations (Vorstellungen). In both cases, 
however, those parts of Erlebnisse that later are distinguished as accompa-
nying feelings or volitions … are still included.  
 
Thus, if every Erlebnis had a dead and a living component, then the allegedly 
unbridgeable abyss between Leben and Geist became an unfounded assumption.8 As 
explained in detail in the next section, Carnap took this structure from Ziehen, in his 
Erkenntnistheorie, who had introduced it for very different reasons.9   
 
 
I I I . Chaos as the Germ of Aufbau . 
 
In this section, I’d like to show that the essential ingredients of Carnaps’s Chaos were 
Rickert’s System and Ziehen’s Erkenntnistheorie. Indeed, Chaos may be conceived of as 
an attempt to synthesize Ziehen’s Erkenntnistheorie and Rickert’s project of the 
constitution of an ordered world (cosmos) from the “chaos” of a tangle of experiences 
(Erlebnisse). Ciarnap wrote in the right margin of the first page of Chaos, apparently 
after 1928:  
        This is the germ of the constitution theory of the “Log. Aufbau!”10  
 
This is virtually the only quotation from Chaos of which commentators take note.11 As I 
want to show that Chaos contains more than this one line that may be useful in elu-
cidating some intricate interpretative issues in the Aufbau .  
                                                
8 A similar argument - that an antagonistic clash between Leben and Geist as advocated by 
Klages and his partisans is inconsistent - can also be found in Cassirer (1995). 
9 Ironically, the living/dead distinction was given up in the Aufbau. Apparently, Carnap no longer 
considered it necessary to respond slavishly to all requirements of Lebensphilosophie. 
10 Das ist der Keim zur Konstitutionstheorie des “Log. Aufbau”! 
11 An exception is Tennant (1987), who quotes an entire  passage from Chaos but without inter-
preting it.   
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The Chaos manuscript is a promising field for speculations concerning influences 
because the author made no effort to comply with the usual academic requirements of 
providing references, quotes, or sources. For instance, one may speculate that 
Husserl’s phenomenology may also have influenced its content (cf. Mayer (1992), 
Rosado Haddock (2008)).      
The central theme of Chaos is a sketch of the constitution of an epistemically ordered 
world (“Wirklichkeit”) from an epistemic Chaos of Erlebnisse. This constitution is not 
meant to be a realistic description of what really happened in the cognitive history of 
the individual or the species. It is a “fiction” in the sense of Vaihinger. It can be seen as 
an extrapolation of the more common situation that arises when we are confronted 
with discrepancies between our cognitive expectations and experiences. In a Nietz-
schean vein, Carnap described it as follows: 
  
The will to achieve a new order and to eliminate the gross inconsistencies is 
what gives rise to the epistemological considerations and the fictions that 
appear in them such as the chaos as a point of departure and the order 
principles according to which the (ordering) process develops.   
This will to overcome the inconsistencies of reality by reconstructing it is 
also the irrational starting point of our theory. (Chaos, 1, emphasis mine, 
TM)12 
 
This echoes Rickert, who in System and Die Lebensphilosophie asserted:  
 
... [T]he will for the philosophical consideration of the world … is necessari-
ly connected with the “will to the system”.13 (System, 10, emphasis and 
translation mine, TM) 
... 
Philosophy has to think the world in such a way that from the chaos of 
Erlebnisse a Kosmos arises that is ordered and articulated by principles.14 
(System, 50, translation mine). 
                                                
12  German original: „Dieser Wille zur Neuordnung, zur Beseitigung der großen Unstimmigkeiten ist 
es, der die erkenntnistheoretische Ueberlegung und die in ihr auftretenden Fiktionen vom Chaos 
als Ausgangspunkt und von den Ordnungsprinzipien, nach denen der Bau geschehen ist, ge-
schieht, und geschehen soll, veranlasst.  
Dieer Wille, die Unstimmigkeiten der Wirklichkeit durch Umbau der Wirklichkeit zu überwinden, ist 
auch der irrationale Ausgangspunkt unserer Theorie.“ 
13 German original: „So ist mit dem Willen zur philosophischen Betrachtung der Welt der „Wille 
zum System“ ... notwendig verknüpft.“ 
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The similarity between the general programs of Rickert’s System and Carnap’s Chaos 
should be obvious.  
Let us now consider Ziehen’s contribution to Chaos in some detail. Theodor Ziehen 
(1862 – 1950) was a philosopher, psychologist, and psychiatrist.15 Today, Ziehen has 
fallen into almost complete obscurity as a philosopher, and, in particular, as a possible 
influence on Carnap.16 He considered himself a “critical positivist” in the line of Mach 
and Avenarius. According to him, it was of outmost importance for a scientifically 
acceptable epistemology to begin with the “given” without smuggling in hidden 
assumptions that relied on linguistic or conceptual suggestions of the vocabulary used. 
To avoid succumbing to the various conceptual temptations that may arise from 
conceptual associations of vocabulary, he expressed his account in quite artificial 
technical terms. For Ziehen, the directly given basis of epistemology was a class of 
“gignomena”. In psychological language, which Ziehen was at pains to avoid at the 
beginning of his system, a “gignomenon” was something like a sensation (Empfindung) 
or, in a slightly different interpretation, an idea (Vorstellung). Ziehen preferred to avoid 
these highly charged concepts. Instead, he chose to maintain a strictly “neutral” 
language that could serve as a perfect mirror of the immediately given, namely the 
gignomena. The counterparts of the Aufbau’s Erlebnisse do not suffice, however, to 
build an epistemology that deserves this name:     
 
After having accepted the gignomena as a matter of fact, epistemology has 
the task to classify and order them. For this purpose, the principle of 
classification has to be clearly stated and justified. In particular, the 
                                                                                                                                          
14 German Original: „Die Philosophie hat die Welt so zu denken, daß aus dem Chaos der Erlebnisse 
ein nach Prinzipien geordneter und gegliederter Kosmos entsteht.“ 
15 Ziehen obtained a PhD in medicine (psychiatry) in 1885. Later he habilitated with Otto Bins-
wanger and became his assistant at the psychiatric clinic in Jena. One of his patients there was 
Friedrich Nietzsche, after he had suffered a breakdown in Turin in 1889.   
16 Useful general information on Ziehen’s life and work may be found on the website 
http://www.stork-herbstde/sides/_thziehen.html maintained by August Herbst. For some perti-
nent remarks on the relation of Ziehen’s Erkenntnistheorie and Carnap’s Aufbau and Ziehen’s role 
in the then contemporary debates on the concept of „order“ the reader may consult Paul Ziche’s 
Theories of order in Carnap’s Aufbau (this volume). On the other hand, Carnap’s references in 
the Aufbau don’t shed much light on Ziehen’s role for his thought. Things become clearer if we 
have a closer look on Chaos.   
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introduction of a hypothesis – for instance the hypothesis of an cognizing 
ego or something like that – has to be avoided. The classification has to be 
only an ordered description. (Ziehen 1913, 3, 4) 
 
The central question then becomes: according to what principles is the “ordered des-
cription” of the gignomena to be carried out? Ziehen, driven by his positivist conviction 
not to rely on any “subjective” order for ordering the gignomena, insisted that only the 
most austere principle for an “ordered description” of gignomena was to be used:  
  
The principle of classification is only one - that of difference and similarity. 
The idea of difference, equality, and similarity, respectively is, leaving aside 
spatial and temporal relations, which cannot be used for classificatory 
purposes, …the only general and original relation. (Ziehen 1913, 3 - 4).   
 
According to Ziehen, therefore, not only the basic elements – the gignomena – but also 
the basic relation between them – the similarity relation between gignomena – 
belonged to the given. In other words, Ziehen subscribed to a type of structural realism 
according to which the basis of the “system of the world” was the class of gignomena 
endowed with a similarity relation.17  
From this basic level of gignomena cum similarity relation, higher order objects could be 
constructed as Koinaden of gignomena. In other words, classes of similar gignomena, 
then Koinaden of Koinaden of gignomena, and so on. Carnap was later to explain this 
hierarchy more clearly in Chaos and in the Aufbau. Ziehen was content to illustrate the 
process of constitution with the following intuitive example. Consider a checkerboard, 
with white and black squares. A single square is constituted as a class of similar 
gignomena, their similarity given by the fact that they all have the color black, say. In 
Ziehen’s terminology, such a similarity class is a “Koinade”, more precisely, a Koinade of 
the first order. The checkerboard itself is characterized as a Koinade of second order 
because all its squares are more similar to each other than they are to the gignomena 
that occurred in their neighborhood (cf. Ziehen (1913, 16f).  
                                                
17 By contrast, Carnap, in the Aufbau, subscribed to a mixed pedigree of the basic ingredients of 
his constitutional system. According to him, the basic elements – Elementarerlebnisse – were 
contributed by positivism, and the basic relation  - Ähnlichkeitserinnerung – was a contribution of 
“transcendental idealism” (cf. Aufbau § 75). For Ziehen, both the elements and the basic relation 
of similarity belong to the “given”.  
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Ziehen did not invest much effort in giving a precise description of this constitution 
process. He was content to note the importance of his “Koinadenprinzip” in general 
terms. According to Ziehen, the objects of the world were to be constituted by a single 
principle - the Koinadenprinzip - based on the irreducible concept of similarity between 
gignomena. This Koinadenprinzip may be considered as an informal version of Carnap’s 
quasi-analytical constitutional method.  
Ziehen’s specific version of a Machian neutral monism enabled Carnap to develop the 
constitutional method of quasi-analysis. What Carnap did in the Ur-Aufbau was to 
replace Ziehen’s clumsy terminology, such as “gignomena” and “Koinaden”, with a more 
appealing terminology inspired by the fashionable terms of Lebensphilosophie. Ziehen’s 
original structure remained essentially intact. Carnap demonstrated in Chaos, and later 
in the Aufbau, that the tools of modern relational logic could be applied to this 
structure. 
Indeed, one may set up a neat translation manual between the basic vocabulary of 
Ziehen’s Erkenntnistheorie and Carnap’s Chaos in which Ziehen’s neutral “scientific” 
terms are translated into terms that obviously did not intend to be “neutral”. Instead, 
the new terms were heavily charged with connotations inspired by Lebensphilosophie. 
One might obtain the following translation manual: 
 
             Ziehen          Carnap 
  Basic elements            Gignomen         Erlebnis 
  Sensation     Empfindungsgignomen     Living Part of Erlebnis 
  Representation     Vorstellungsgignomen     Dead Part of Erlebnis 
  The Given          Set of Gignomena     Chaos of Erlebnisse 
  Basic Relation          Similarity Relation     Similarity Relation G 
  Higher Order Object               Koinade      Quality Class 
      2nd Order Koinade    
                ......  
  
The most important translation is the “main similarity relation” (“Hauptgleichheit”) G. 
The binary relation G is to be reflexive and symmetric but not necessarily transitive. In 
psychological language, the state of affairs Gab between two building blocks a and b 
obtains if and only if they are similar with respect to (at least) one sensational aspect, 
for instance, if a and b share the same shadow of blue in the visual field or the same 
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sound in the acoustic field. In Chaos, Carnap was already well aware that the Erlebnisse 
a and b, and b and c, respectively, may belong to the field of G. That is, Gab and Gbc 
may obtain, but Gbc does not, since a and c do not share a common aspect that 
renders them similar.   
The relation G enabled the fictitious Aufbauer to constitute so-called quality classes as 
elements of the next higher level of the constitutional system: A class q of building 
blocks is a quality class if and only if it satisfies the following two conditions: any two 
elements of q stand in the relation G to each other; every building block that stands in 
relation G to all elements of G, also belongs to q. This is exactly the same definition of 
the quasi-analytical constitution of quality classes that later was to appear in the 
Aufbau. 
The most important novel feature of Ziehen’s account is to conceive “higher order” 
entities as constituted as classes of similar gignomena; these classes are called 
“Koinaden” (from the Greek “koinos” = “common”). In Chaos, Koinaden are renamed 
“quality classes”, and they are defined as maximal classes of similar Erlebnisse. Already, 
Ziehen had recognized that to avoid an infinite regress of gignomena, properties of 
gignomena, properties of properties of gignomena, and so on, one had to take the simi-
larity concept as a primitive relational concept. That is to say, similarity was not 
explained further by referring to properties that similar gignomena had in common. This 
idea of conceiving similarity as a basic relational primitive is the core of the quasi-
analytical constitution method. He took similarity as a primitive relational concept in 
the sense that two gignomena a and b are similar or they are not similar. At the 
beginning of the process of constitution there are no properties of gignomena that may 
serve as “carriers” of the similarity relation in that gignomena are similar if and only if 
they have a property in common.  
Carnap renamed Ziehen’s “Koinaden” “quality classes” and defined them precisely as 
maximal similarity classes.18 If the underlying similarity relation happens to be a 
transitive relation, then the resulting maximal classes are just equivalence classes. 
Thus, Ziehen’s “Koinadenprinzip” of constituting (maximal) classes of similar 
gignomena, classes of classes of similar gignomena, and so on, may be understood as a 
                                                
18 A similarity structure (S, ~) is given by a set S and a binary reflexive and symmetrical relation ~ 
on S, and a subset T ⊆ S is a maximal similarity class (or similarity circle) if and only if it satisfies 
the following requirements: ∀a, b, c (a, b ∈ T ⇒ a ~ b) & (a ∈ T ⇒ a ~ c) ⇒ c ∈ T)). Informally, T 
is a maximal similarity class if and only if all elements of T are similar to each other, and if there is 
an element that is similar to all elements of T, then it is already an element of T. 
  17 
generalization of the Frege-Whitehead method of constitution by equivalence classes. 
The following lengthy quote demonstrates that the basic idea of quasi-analysis was 
already present in Chaos: 
 
We have disassembled the present experience in components due to the 
distinctions between “living vs. dead” and “finished vs. unfinished”. We will 
call these components … building blocks (Bausteine) because they are used 
for the construction (Aufbau) (of Wirklichkeit). We don’t go further in the 
process of dismantling the present experience. Rather, we consider the 
building blocks as indivisible totalities, although they comprise everything 
that the later abstraction distinguishes as the seen, the heard, and so on, 
and also as the partial sounds of a tone, the color spots of a visual field and 
so on. We too have to arrive at these concepts, but rather than doing so by 
analysis, we do so by synthesis (Aufbau). For us, they are not parts of 
building blocks but classes of them that are constituted by certain relations 
that exist between the building blocks (Emphasis mine, TM). 
 
In the Aufbau, this general schema of constitutional theory is simplified considerably 
and simultaneously elaborated in detail for the simplest remaining case. The “basic 
building blocks” are restricted to Elementarerlebnisse, and there is only one similarity 
relation. The objects of the next level are certain subsets of Elementarerlebnisse or 
similarity classes. Because the objects of this level are sets, a natural similarity relation 
can be defined by stipulating that two sets of Elementarerlebnisse are similar if and 
only if they have a non-trivial intersection. Obviously, this can be iterated, thereby 
enabling quasi-analytical constitutions on all levels.   
Ziehen was content to invoke a general “Koinadenprinzip”, according to which higher 
order objects were constituted from lower ones as “Koinaden” of similar elements 
whereby the underlying similarity relation was “somehow” defined by taking into 
account certain unspecified “continuities” and “discontinuities”. Carnap, however, 
offered an apparently much more precise account of quasi-analytical constitution. In 
fact, he carried out only the constitution of the first (next to base) level in terms of 
relational logic. Then, he fobbed off the reader by noting that he was only interested in 
giving a sketch of how constitution might work and not in working out detailed chains 
of constitution. With respect to full-fledged constitutions of higher order objects, the 
reader is not much better off with the Aufbau than with Ziehen’s Erkenntnistheorie.   
In the part of Carnap’s Intellectual Autography in which he addresses the origins of the 
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method of quasi-analysis, Ziehen is not mentioned. In the Aufbau, Carnap addresses 
only the simplified version of the method rather than the more complex version that he 
had developed in the Ur-Aufbau:      
 
I developed a method called “quasi-analysis”, which leads, on the basis of 
the similarity-relation among experiences, to the logical construction of 
those entities which are usually conceived as components… (Carnap 1963, 
Autobiography, 16 – 17) 
 
In the longer, unpublished account of the Intellectual Autobiography, one finds the 
following more detailed remarks on the origin of this method in 1922:      
 
There was a heated debate on the question whether a momentary experi-
ence could contain sense-data as actual parts or not. Hertz declared actual 
components indispensable, while Lewin rejected them emphatically from the 
point of view of gestalt psychology. Reichenbach tried to reconcile the two 
sides by the conception that the controversy was largely a question of 
terminology. I tried to show that a certain method of logical analysis, which 
I called “quasi-analysis” did justice to the justified demands of both sides by 
preserving on the one hand the experiences as indivisible units and on the 
other hand, constructing certain complexes of experiences that correspond 
to the traditional components. (D21ff) 
 
Ziehen is not mentioned, even though ‘constitution by quasi-analysis’ is merely a more 
precise version of the constitution by Ziehen’s “Koinadenprinzip” (cf. (Ziehen 1913)). 
As Joelle Proust, Nelson Goodman, and others have noted, quasi-analysis may be 
considered the most important formal innovation of Aufbau. (cf. Proust 1989, 
Mormann (1994), Leitgeb (2008), Mormann (2009)). Proust asserted, with good 
reasons, that:  
 
the true interest in the Aufbau lies not in the example of a constitution 
system it offers but in the set of formal procedures that it is the function 
of the example to illustrate. (Proust (1989, 185)) 
 
The most important of these “formal procedures” is certainly the quasi-analytical con-
stitution method, although this is not generally recognized. For instance, Carus (2007) 
and Rosado Haddock (2009) do not mention the issue of quasi-analysis at all. This is 
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certainly a loophole; in the opening paragraphs of the Aufbau, in which Carnap 
explained the aim of the work (“a constitutional system of concepts” (§1)), the mea-
ning of “constitution” (§2), and the method to be employed (“the analysis of reality 
with the aid of the theory of relations” (§3)) he left no doubt that he considered the 
issue of “method” to be of utmost importance. Moreover, he was convinced that the 
Aufbau would make an important contribution in this area:   
 
... [T]he reduction of “reality” to the “given” has in recent times been 
considered an important task and has been partially accomplished, for 
example, by Avenarius, Mach, Poincaré, Külpe, and especially by Ziehen and 
Driesch (to mention only a few names). The present study is an attempt to 
apply the theory of relations to the task of analyzing reality. (Aufbau, §3) 
 
This quotation exhibits an interesting strategy for emphasizing the importance and 
novelty of the Aufbau’s method. First, quite a few predecessors are named, suggesting 
that many more could have been named. This process implicitly devalues and/or 
relativizes the philosophical originality and value of their work. All existing approaches 
are then characterized negatively as lacking an essential feature, which is, 
unsurprisingly, a strategy of Carnap’s devising.  
A closer look at Ziehen’s Erkenntnistheorie reveals, however, that things are more com-
plicated in the case of quasi-analysis. Ziehen is not simply a predecessor, he does offer 
a relational description via a basic similarity relation between the basic elements of his 
system (i.e. gignomena). What Ziehen’s system is missing from a constitution system à 
la Aufbau is a precise characterization of the “Koinaden” as “quality classes”, i.e., as 
maximal similarity classes with the help of relational logic. 
Let us take stock and summarize the senses in which Chaos goes beyond Rickert’s 
System, Ziehen’s Erkenntnistheorie, and Russell’s Our Knowledge of the External World:   
 
• Rickert’s vague proposal that the emergence of order is based on valuational 
principles is replaced by a more precise description of order generation by 
quasi-analytical constitution based on a similarity relation. 
• Ziehen’s conceptual apparatus is simplified and cast into a form that is suited to 
applying the calculus of relational logic. The vaguely-characterized Koinaden are 
replaced by precisely defined quality classes.  
• Chaos goes beyond Russell’s programs by applying the apparatus of relational 
logic in a concrete and specific way to similarity structures, instead of providing 
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IV. Values in the Aufbau . 
 
In the preferred constitutional system of the Aufbau, the world is constituted as a 
structure consisting of four layers: autopsychogical, physical, heteropsychological, and 
cultural objects (cf. Aufbau, Summary, pp. 241/242). Most interpretations of the 
Aufbau have concentrated on the constitution of the autopsychological and the 
physical, whereas the higher layers of the heteropsychological and the cultural have 
generally been ignored. I do not feel this is justified. Even if the constitutions of the 
higher layers are sketchy, they shed interesting new light on the internal history of 
Carnap’s Aufbau project. They demonstrate that at least in the beginning, the Aufbau 
project aimed at the constitution of a world that understood physical objects not only 
as logical constructs from sense data but also as cultural objects, thereby rendering it 
a meaningful world in a comprehensive sense.   
Among so-called cultural objects, one find values in particular (§ 152). Although they 
belong to the fourth constitutional level of the system, their constitution is based on 
items belonging to the lowest level of the constitutional system, namely 
Elementarerlebnisse of a special kind:   
 
The construction of values from certain Erlebnisse, namely Werterlebnisse, 
is in many ways analogous to the construction of physical things from 
"perceptual experiences" ... For the construction of ethical values, for 
example, we must consider (among others) experiences of conscience, 
experiences of duty or of responsibility, etc. For aesthetic values, we take 
into account experiences of (aesthetic) pleasure or other attitudes in the 
appreciation of art, experiences of artistic creation, etc. The particular 
nature of the value experiences of the different value types is investigated 
by the phenomenology of values... (Aufbau, § 152).  
 
This programmatic passage is clearly inspired by Rickert’s Wertphilosophie and Hus-
serl’s Phänomenologie. Without doubt, the constitution of values originally belonged to 
the core of the constitution program. Carnap considered it to be essential for 
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constitution theory in general that this was the case, regardless of the specifics of a 
constitution system. Carnap explicitly noted that values could be constituted not only 
for constitution systems with an autopsychological basis but also for systems with a 
physical basis, a point allegedly shown by Ostwald’s “energetistic” Werttheorie (cf. 
Aufbau § 59, Ostwald (1913)).19  
Nevertheless, in the published version of the Aufbau, Carnap’s vigorous defense of a 
two-tiered constitution of values was already showing cracks as evidenced by the 
strange “pseudo-reference” to Rickert in the §42 of the Aufbau. This paragraph is 
labeled “can be omitted”, as if Carnap wanted to avoid mentioning Rickert at all costs:   
 
Fundamentally, the difference between being and holding, of which so much 
has been made in recent philosophy, goes back to the difference between 
object spheres, more precisely, to the difference between proper objects 
and quasi objects. For, if a quasi object is constructed on the basis of 
certain elements, then it “holds” for these elements; thus, it is 
distinguished as something that holds from the elements which have being. 
…  
 
Despite his dismissive attitude towards “the difference between being and holding, of 
                                                
19 Carnap was at pains to ensure that values could be constituted for all kinds of constitution 
systems, not only for autopsychological ones but also for physicalist ones. This demonstrates 
that at least until 1925, the constitution of values was very important to him,: 
“It could seem to be an open question whether in a constitutional system with physical basis 
there is room for the domain of values. This doubt, however, has been removed by Ostwald 
[Werte] with his derivation of values of several types upon a basis of energetics ... From a 
philosophical standpoint, it must be admitted that there is a methodological justification and 
fruitfulness, not only for the experiential “phenomenological” but also for the energetistic 
derivation of values. (We shall employ the phenomenological method in the outline of our 
constitutional system, cf. § 152. The decision between the two is not a question of validity but 
one of system form; the difference lies merely in the way in which the problems are posed and 
the concepts constructed. Science as a whole needs both theories to exhibit both directions of 
logical reducibility, just as it needs a behavioristic as well as an introspective psychology; in 
general, it needs both an experiential and a materialistic derivation of all concepts.” (Aufbau, 
§59).    
This project of the constitution of values left no trace in Carnap’s later work. This is not to say 
that the issues of values and valuations did not occupy him till the end of his career; see the 
discussions with Morris and Kaplan on this topics in Carnap (1963). 
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which so much has been made in recent philosophy”, Carnap boasted that he had gone 
beyond Rickert:  
 
Construction theory goes beyond the customary conception of being and 
holding by claiming that this contrast does not arise only once, that there is 
only one boundary between being and holding, but that this relationship, 
constantly repeated, leads from level to level… Hence, the concepts being 
and holding are relative and express the relation between each constituti-
onal level and the succeeding one. (§ 42) 
 
In an almost Hegelian style, he then concluded that “construction theory explicated the 
logically strict form of the dialectic of the conceptual process” (ibid.).  
In 1928, this interpretation of the quasi-analytical constitution as a kind of valuation in 
the style of Rickert was already on the verge of being abandoned, as evidenced by the 
“can be omitted” label on §42. However, around 1925, in an earlier phase of the 
Aufbau, “quasi-analyzing as valuating” was an integral part of the “logic of constitution 
forms”. This is evidenced by the unpublished manuscript Entwurf einer Konstitutions-
theorie der Erkenntnisgegenstände (Carnap 1925, RC 081-05-02) in which “Sein und 
Gelten” appears as one among twelve sections of the chapter Die Logik der Konst-
itutionsformen. 
The precarious situation of values in the later Aufbau project should not simply be 
interpreted as if Carnap was moving from a cognitivist to a non-cognitivist ethical 
standpoint. Rather, by denying them the status of objects of a constitutional system, 
Carnap denied values a rational status in a broader sense. Values were no longer consi-
dered worth of being explicated in a rational way.   
Values were only one type of cultural object that originally belonged to the realm of 
objects constituted in the Aufbau. For the constitution of cultural objects such as 
habits, manners and similar manifestations of the “objective spirit”, Carnap relied on 
Wilhelm Dilthey and, in particular, on Hans Freyer’s Theorie des objektiven Geistes 
(Freyer 1923). Indeed, Carnap’s readiness to accept cultural objects (and possibly 
other types of objects, see §162 of the Aufbau) as an independent class of objects of 
constitutional systems shows that, at least for some time, he subscribed to a liberal 
ontological pluralism according to which the traditional dualism, which recognized 
physical and psychological objects, remained incomplete:   
 
The philosophy of 19th century did not pay sufficient attention to the fact 
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that the cultural objects form an autonomous type. The reason for this is 
that epistemological and logical investigations tended to confine their at-
tention predominantly to physics and psychology as paradigmatic subject 
matter areas. Only the more recent history of philosophy (since Dilthey) has 
called attention to the methodological and object-theoretical peculiarity of 
the area of cultural science. (Aufbau, §23) 
 
The only, rather sketchy, example of the constitution of a “primary cultural object” 
Carnap gives in the Aufbau is the constitution of the “custom of greeting through the 
lifting of one’s hat” (cf. Aufbau § 150). This example and many of the concepts for 
describing the envisaged constitution of cultural objects were taken from Freyer’s 
Theorie des objektiven Geistes (Freyer 1923) (cf. 54 – 55).20  
The project of the constitution of cultural objects was abandoned after 1928, although 
it is not clear why. One reason may be that the friendship between Carnap and Freyer 
dissolved in the late 1920s, most likely due to political differences.21 Be that as it may, 
by 1932 the concept of “objective spirit” had changed for Carnap from a decent 
concept that could be constituted by the method of “manifestation” (as a variant of 
quasi-analysis) to a metaphysical pseudo-concept:  
 
[Sciences such as sociology] often in their present form contain pseudo- 
concepts, viz. such as have no correct definition, and whose employment is 
based on no empirical criteria; … such (pseudo-)concepts cannot be re-
duced to the given, are therefore void of sense. Examples: “objective 
spirit”, “the meaning of history”, etc. (Carnap 1934, 73) 
  
Carnap never provided an argument for this thesis. One might speculate that he did not 
mean Freyer’s “objective spirit” but its “obviously” metaphysical Hegelian namesake. 
This interpretation is implausible, however, because Carnap took “objective spirit” as a 
                                                
20 Freyer suggested a close parallelism between Carnap’s Aufbau of the objective world of 
physical objects and the constitution of the objective world of cultural objects constituted in the 
course of history. He considered his account, which he described as a systematic 
“Kulturphilosophie” as a kind of complement to Dilthey’s Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den 
Geisteswissenschaften“ (Freyer (1923, 10,11)). Freyer literally aimed at a “structural theory of 
the Aufbau of the cultural world”, i.e., a structural theory of the world of cultural objects (ibid.).   
21 Freyer moved politically to the extreme right in the immediate neighborhood of National 
Socialism (cf. Muller 1987). 
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sociological rather than a philosophical concept. The fact that Freyer had been 
appointed to the newly established first chair of sociology at a German university in 
1925 (in Leipzig) should remove any doubts that the “objective spirit” addressed 
above was Freyer’s.       
In summary, one might say that in the early phases of the Aufbau project Carnap opted 
for a “comprehensive scientific philosophy”. According to this philosophy, not only 
empirical facts but also values and other cultural objects belonged to the ken of 
scientific philosophy. Around 1930, Carnap must have come to the conclusion that this 
program was not feasible. From then on, he favored a “restrictive scientific 
philosophy”, according to which values dropped out of the realm of reason and were no 
longer considered respectable objects of study for scientific philosophy. Instead, they 
were relegated to the realm of poetry, music and other non-rational endeavors through 
which one could express Lebensgefühl. Consequently, scientific philosophy was 
restricted to philosophy of science in a narrow sense.   
The original balance between the domain of irrational Lebensgefühle and the domain of 
concepts that could be rationally constituted became unstable around 1928, and the 
border between the two domains shifted. The territory of values, which once had be-
longed to the domain of constitution, was occupied by irrational Leben. The neo-
Kantian constitutional projects were tacitly given up. Values, phenomenological consti-
tutions, and other cultural objects disappeared from the agenda of constitution theo-
ry.22   
This move did not mean that Carnap had lost interest in the “value-laden” issues of 
society, culture, and politics. To the contrary, Carnap’s political commitment to the 
Vienna Circle, the Ernst Mach Society, the Bauhaus and similar institutions reached its 
peak in the early 1930s. However, his commitment was based on his Lebensgefühl and 
not the results and methods of scientific philosophy.   
The expulsion of values and other cultural objects from the realm of constitution theo-
ry led to a strict separation between the domains of Leben and Geist that replaced 
their originally envisaged polarity. By eliminating values from the realm of objects that 
can be constituted, an explicit and rational discussion of these issues fell outside the 
realm of rational discourse. Values, valuation, and related concepts no longer belonged 
to the realm of respectable philosophical topics. Instead, they were relegated to 
                                                
22 For the later Carnap’s means of dealing with values see Carnap (1963), Kaplan (1963), and 
Mormann (2006). 
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implicit and intuitive decisions dependent on one’s Wertgefühle.23  
 
V. Concluding Remarks. 
 
Carnap’s descriptions of his philosophical influences are not always reliable. This is 
particularly true of his formative years in Jena, Freiburg, and Vienna. His volatile 
attitude in the 1910s and 1920s towards the various currents of neo-Kantianism, 
phenomenology, and other philosophical currents, later characterized as “continental”, 
such as Lebensphilosophie, are not fully understood. The evolution of his thought did 
not always follow the straight paths he described in his Intellectual Autobiography.   
Over the years, the radical rhetoric of his early years was replaced by more sober 
language. The impact of Lebensphilosophie is mitigated, although it did not fully 
disappear. The Nietzsche/Vaihinger “fictitious constitution of an ordered world out of 
chaos” (Chaos, 1) became in the Aufbau: a “rational reconstruction of reality…” 
(Aufbau, §100). Traces of chaos, however, survive in the new context. For instance, in 
the preface of the Aufbau’s first edition, Carnap described the basic orientation of the 
Aufbau and related work of his fellow logical empiricists in Vienna as marked by an 
attitude:  
 
“which demands clarity everywhere, but which realizes that the fabric of life 
can never be quite comprehended.” (Aufbau, xvii) 
 
This can be read as the implicit claim that Leben could not be completely subordinated 
to rationality. Rather, Leben and Geist were to remain two independent spheres, and 
more generally, the Aufbauer recognizes the “existence and importance of the 
remaining, irrational spheres …”.24   
                                                
23  This is not to say that Carnap’s account of values and valuations in the Aufbau were satisfying 
in any sense: A telling example is Ostwald’s “energetic” constitution of values. Carnap mentioned 
Ostwald’s approach as a successful “physicalist” constitution, although Weber had already, in 
1909, launched a devastating critique of Ostwald’s “energetic Kulturtheorie” (which included the 
theory of values) (cf. Weber (1909)). Similarly, Carnap’s meager remarks on a “phenomenology 
of various kinds of values” (Aufbau, §152) cannot be considered a full-  blown theory of values 
and valuations. But, at least, these spurious remarks left open the possibility of further deve-
lopment.  
24 See, for instance, the approving quotation from the Tractatus on the last page of the Aufbau 
(§ 183):  “We feel that even if all possible scientific questions be answered, the problems of life 
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Interpreting the Aufbau project as an attempt to overcome the specifically Weimar 
polarity of Leben and Geist suggests that it is important to take into account its quite 
specific historical, cultural, and philosophical context when attempting to understand 
the Aufbau.  
A localized interpretation on this basis has the advantage of viewing the Aufbau project 
as one stage in Carnap’s on-going philosophical development, which led, in the following 
years, to the partially realized program of Einheitswissenschaft. Carnap’s reconciliatory 
intentions in the Aufbau project, which aimed at a peaceful and fruitful co-existence 
between Geist and Leben (cf. §181ff and Manifesto p. 30).   
The task of contributing to the improvement of life remained on the agenda of the 
Vienna Circle until its dissolution (cf. Romizi (2012)), although not even the most 
ardent partisans of Vienna logical empiricism can claim that it was overly successful in 
this endeavor. Does this mean that, all in all, the Aufbau program should also to be 
considered as a failure? I do not think so.  
One of the best arguments for a more optimistic assessment remains the one put 
forward by Goodman long ago: 
 
The Aufbau, for all its fragmentary character, and for all its defects, is still 
one of the fullest examples we have of the logical treatment of problems in 
non-mathematical philosophy. But its significance in the long run will be 
measured less by how far it goes than by how far it is superseded. 
… 
The Aufbau cannot yet, however, be relegated to the status of a 
monument having purely historical interest. Its lessons have not been fully 
enough learned. (Goodman 1963, 588) 
 
To me, the essential point of this argument is Goodman’s insight that the Aufbau was 
one of the first (and fullest) “examples we have of the logical treatment of problems in 
non-mathematical philosophy”. I would put the accent in a slightly different way by 
saying that the Aufbau offers some highly interesting examples of the mathematical 
treatment of non-mathematical problems in philosophy. To put it bluntly, the Aufbau is 
an early example of mathematical philosophy, i.e., an example of philosophy that 
employs qua philosophy methods (and results) of mathematics. A mathematical 
                                                                                                                                          
have still not been touched at all. Of course, there is then no question left, and just this is the 
answer.“ (Tractatus, 6.52)  
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philosophy need not be per se a more scientific philosophy.    
Contemporary interpretations of the Aufbau, however, usually shy away from the task 
of dealing in detail with the mathematical aspects of this work. According to many 
theorists, Goodman finished with the issue of quasi-analysis once and for all. There are 
few exceptions, such as Proust (1989), Leitgeb (2008), and Mormann (1994, 2009).  
Goodman’s thesis invites us to reverse the perspective on “influences”. Instead of 
considering influences as solely connections to the past, one may ask what influence 
the Aufbau may have on the future development of philosophy. Indeed, this may be the 
more interesting half of the task of determining the “influences” on a philosophical 
work. Arguably, the most promising candidate for such an influence on future 
philosophy is the quasi-analytical method, notwithstanding the fact that, for a long 
time, quasi-analysis was considered one of the Carnap’s many ingenious projects that 
had been definitively shown not to work. The key witness for this claim was (and 
sometimes remains) Goodman’s criticism of the method (Goodman, 1951, chapter V).  
Proust (1989) is most likely the first paper in which the definitiveness of Goodman’s 
verdict is put into doubt. Since then, other authors have argued that quasi-analysis is 
not the dead horse Goodman would have us believe. (See e.g., Mormann (1994), 
Leitgeb (2008), Mormann (2009)). A promising strategy in this endeavor is to show 
that the method of quasi-analysis is not restricted to the simplistic version discussed in 
the Aufbau. In 1923, Carnap had already presented, in Die Quasizerlegung - Ein 
Verfahren zur Ordnung nichthomogener Mengen mit den Mitteln der Beziehungslehre, 
(Carnap 1923, RC-081-04-01), a sophisticated version of quasi-analysis that overcame 
many of the allegedly insurmountable difficulties that Goodman, and other critics, had 
put forward. In pursuing the task of updating the quasi-analytical method, it is 
necessary to use formal means taken from a variety of mathematical theories. The 
resulting mathematical philosophy, modeled on Carnap, may differ considerably from 
traditional Carnap exegesis, but this need not be a disadvantage.   
 
References. 
Arendt, H., 1969, Martin Heidegger ist 80 Jahre alt, Merkur XXIII, Heft 258, Klett-Cotta, 
Stuttgart, 893 – 902. 
Aschheim, S.E., 1992, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany 1890 – 1990, Berkeley, Uni-
versity of California Press.  
Banks, E.C., 2003, Ernst Mach’s World Elements: A Study in Natural Philosophy, Dord-
recht, Kluwer. 
  28 
Bergson, H., 1921, Schöpferische Entwicklung, Jena, Eugen Diederichs. 
Carnap, R., 1918, Deutschlands Niederlage: Sinnloses Schicksal oder Schuld?, October 
1918, (RC 089-72-04). 
Carnap, R., 1920, Skelett der Erkenntnistheorie, August 1920, (RC 081-05-04). 
Carnap, R., 1921, Analyse des Weltbildes, April 1921, (RC 081-05-06). 
Carnap, R., 1921, Über die Analyse von Erlebnissen, September 1921, (RC 081-05-05). 
Carnap, R., 1922, Der Raum: Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftslehre, Kant-Studien Ergänz-
ungshefte Nr. 56, Berlin, Reuther & Reichard. 
Carnap, R., 1922, Vom Chaos zur Wirklichkeit, Unpublished Ms., RC-081-05-01. 
Carnap, R., 1923, Die Quasizerlegung - Ein Verfahren zur Ordnung nichthomogener 
Mengen mit den Mitteln der Beziehungslehre, Unpublished Manuscript RC-081-04-01, 
University of Pittsburgh.  
Carnap, R., 1925, Entwurf einer Konstitutionstheorie der Erkenntnisgegenstände, Ja-
nuar 1925, (RC 081-05-02). 
Carnap, R., 1925, Gedanken zum Kategorienproblem. Prolegomena zu einer Konstituti-
onstheorie (Vortrag Wien), Januar 1925, (RC 081-05-03). 
Carnap, R., 1926, Thesen zur Konstitutionstheorie (Vortrag Wien), before June 29 June 
1926, (RC 081-05-07). 
Carnap, R., 1928, Der logische Aufbau der Welt, Berlin, Weltkreis Verlag. 
Carnap, R., 1934, Theoretische Fragen und praktische Entscheidungen, Natur und Geist 
2, 257 – 260. 
Carnap, R., Hahn, H, Neurath, O., 1929, Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener 
Kreis, Wien, Artur Wolf Verlag.  
Carus, A.W., 2002, The Philosopher without Qualities, in Vienna Circle Yearbook Instit-
ute 9, 369 – 377. 
Carus, A.W., 2007, Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought. Explication as Enlighten-
ment, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.  
Cassirer, E. 1930, „Geist“ und „Leben“ in der Philosophie der Gegenwart, in E. Cassirer, 
Gesammelte Werke  Hamburger Ausgabe, Aufsätze und kleine Schriften Band 17, 185 – 
205, zuerst veröffentlicht in Die Neue Rundschau 41 (1930), 244 – 264. 
Cassirer, E., 1995, Zur Metaphysik der symbolischen Formen, Nachgelassene Manu-
skripte und Texte, Band 1, Hamburg, Meiner Verlag. 
Cassirer, E., 2011, Symbolische Prägnanz, Ausdrucksphänomen und „Wiener Kreis“, 
Nachgelassene Manuskripte und Texte, Band 4, Hamburg, Meiner Verlag. 
  29 
Coffa, J.A., 1991, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Faust, A. 1927, Heinrich Rickert und seine Stellung innerhalb der deutschen Philosophie 
der Gegenwart, Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 
Frank, P., 1955 (1949), Modern Science and its Philosophy, New York, George Braziller. 
Freyer, H., 1923, Theorie des objektiven Geistes, Leipzig, Teubner. 
Friedman, M., 1999, A Parting of the Ways. Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger, Chicago 
and LaSalle, Open Court.   
Frischeisen-Köhler, M., 1921, Philosophie und Leben. Bemerkungen zu Heinrich Rickerts 
Buch: Die Philosophie des Lebens“., Kant-Studien 26, 112 – 138. 
Gabriel, G., 2003, Carnap’s Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of 
Language: A Retrospective Consideration of the Relationship between Continental and 
Analytic Philosophy, in P. Parrini, W.C. Salmon, and M.H. Salmon (eds.), Logical Empi-
ricism: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 30 – 42.  
Gabriel, G., 2004, Introduction: Carnap Brought Home, in S. Awodey and C. Klein (eds.), 
Carnap Brought Home. The View from Jena, Chicago and LaSalle, Open Court, 2 – 24. 
Galison, P., 1996, Constructing Modernism: The Cultural Location of the Aufbau, in R. 
Giere, A. W. Richardson (eds.), Origins of Logical Empiricism, Minnesota Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science Vol. XVI, 17 – 44. 
Goodman, N., 1951, The Strucure of Appearance, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of 
Science, Dordrecht, Reidel, Kluwer. 
Goodman, N., 1963, The Significance of „Der logische Aufbau der Welt“, in P.A. Schilpp 
(ed.), 545 – 558.  
Gordon, P.E., 2010, Continental Divide. Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos, Cambridge and 
London, Harvard University Press.  
Gründer, K., 1988, Cassirer und Heidegger in Davos 1929, in Hans-Jürg Braun, Helmut 
Holzhey und Ernst W. Orth (Hrg.), Über Ernst Cassirers Philosophie der symbolischen 
Formen, Frankfurt/Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 290 – 302. 
Habermas, J., 2009, Von den Weltbildern zur Lebenswelt, in J. Habermas, Philoso-
phische Texte, Kritik der Vernunft, Band 5, Frankfurt/Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 203 – 
270. 
Hamilton, A., 1992, Carnap’s Aufbau and the Legacy of Neutral Monism, in D. Bell, W. 
Vossenkuhl (Hrg.), Wissenschaft und Subjektivität. Der Wiener Kreis und die Philosophie 
des 20. Jahrhunderts, Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 131 – 152. 
  30 
Heidelberger, M., 1985, Zerspaltung und Einheit: vom logischen Aufbau der Welt zum 
Physikalismus, in H.-J. Dahms (Hrg.), Philosophie, Wissenschaft, Aufklärung: Beiträge 
zur Geschichte und Wirkung des Wiener Kreises, Berlin, de Gruyter, 144 – 189. 
Herbst, A., Website Theodor Ziehen: http://www.stork-herbst.de/sides/_thziehen.html. 
Husserl, E., 1954(1936), Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzen-
dentale Phänomenologie: Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie. Transla-
ted by D. Carr as The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology; 
an Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, 1970, Evanston, IL; Northwestern Uni-
versity Press.  
Klages, L., 1929–1933 (19816), Der Geist als Widersacher der Seele, Bonn, Bouvier 
Verlag.  
Krajewski, M., 2006, Restlosigkeit. Weltprojekte um 1900, Frankfurt/Main, Fischer Ta-
schenbuch Verlag. 
Kroner, R., 1910, Henri Bergson, Logos 1, 125 – 150. 
Kusch, M. 1995, Psychologism, London, Routledge and Kegan. 
Lange, F.W., 1866, Geschichte des Materialismus, Leipzig, Verlag von Friedrich 
Brandstetter. 
Laqueur, W.Z., 1962, Young Germany. A History of the German Youth Movement, 
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Leinonen, M., 2013, On Early Carnap’s Metaontology, Unpublished manuscript. 
Leitgeb, H., 2008, New Life for Carnap’s Aufbau?, Synthese, 181 - 236.  
Mach, E., 19116(2008), Die Analyse der Empfindungen und das Verhältnis des Physi-
schen zum Psychischen, Neudruck der sechsten, vermehrten Auflage, Jena, Berlin, Xe- 
nomoi Verlag. 
Mayer, V., 1992, Carnap und Husserl, in D. Bell and W. Vossenkuhl (Hrg.) Wissenschaft 
und Subjektivität. Der Wiener Kreis und die Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, Berlin, 
Akademie Verlag, 185 – 201. 
Mormann, T., 1994, A Representational Reconstruction of Carnap's Quasianalysis, PSA 
1994 , Volume 1, 96-104. 
Mormann, T. 2000, Rudolf Carnap, München, Beck Verlag. 
Mormann, T., 2006, Werte bei Carnap, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 60(2), 
169 – 189. 
Mormann, T., 2007, Carnap’s logical empiricism, values, and American pragmatism, 
Journal of General Philosophy of Science 38, 127 – 146. 
  31 
Mormann, T., 2009, New Work for Carnap’s Quasi-analysis, Journal of Philosophical 
Logic 38(3), 249 – 282.  
Mormann, T. 2013, Wiener wissenschaftliche Weltanschauungen – zwischen Wissen-
schaft, Philosophie, Politik und „Leben“, In Elisabeth Nemeth & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), 
Die europäische Wissenschaftsphilosophie und das Wiener Erbe. Veröffentlichungen des 
Instituts Wiener Kreis Bd. 18, Springer, 105 – 125. 
Moulines, C.U., 1982, Las raíces epistemológicas del "Aufbau" de Carnap, Diánoia, 
Mexico, 213 -234.  
Muller, J.Z., 1987, The Other God That Failed. Hans Freyer and the Deradicalization of 
German Conservatism, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press. 
Neurath, O., 1936, Einzelwissenschaften, Einheitswissenschaft, Pseudorationalismus, 
Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique I, Philosophie Scientifique et 
Empirisme Logique, Actualités Scientifiques et Industrielles 388, Hermann, Paris, 36 – 
41. 
Nietzsche, F., 1873, Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn, in Werke. Kritische 
Gesamtausgabe, De Gruyter & Co, Berlin, 1970.     
Ott, K., 1997, Ipso Facto. Zur ethischen Begründung normativer Implikate wissen-
schaftlicher Praxis, Frankfurt/Main, Suhrkamp Verlag. 
Pincock, C., 2005, A reserved reading of Carnap’s Aufbau, Pacific Philosophy Quaterly 
86, 518 – 543. 
Proust, J., 1985, Quasi-analyse et construction du monde, Fundamenta Scientiae 5, 
285 – 304. 
Proust, J., 1989, Questions of Form, Logic and the Analytic Proposition from Kant to 
Carnap, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press. 
Quine, W.V.O., 1953, From a logical point of view, Cambridge/Mass. Harvard University 
Press.   
Quine, W.V.O., 1969, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York and London, 
Columbia University Press. 
Quine, W.V.O., 1995, From Stimulus to Science, Cambridge/Massachusetts, Harvard 
University Press. 
Richardson, A.W., 1990, How not to Russell Carnap’s Aufbau, in PSA, Proceedings of 
the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1990, Volume 1: 
Contributed papers, 3 – 14. 
Richardson, A.W., 1998, Carnap’s Construction of the World: The Aufbau and the Emer-
gence of Logical Empiricism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
  32 
Rickert, H., 1910, Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft, Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr 
(Paul Siebeck). 
Rickert, H., 1921, Die Philosophie des Lebens, Darstellung und Kritik der philosophi-
schen Modeströmungen unserer Zeit, Tübingen,  J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 
Rickert, H., 1921, System der Philosophie, Erster Teil, Allgemeine Grundlegung der Phi-
losophie, Tübingen,  J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 
Rosado Haddock, G. E., 2008, The Young Carnap’s Unknown Master, Aldershot, Ash-
gate. 
Ringer, F. K., 1990(1969), The Decline of the German Mandarins. The German Acade-
mic Community 1890 – 1933, Hanover and London, University Press of New England. 
Romizi, D., 2012, The Vienna Circle’s “Scientific World-Conception”: Philosophy of Sci-
ence in the Political Arena. HOPOS 2 (2):205-242. 
Rungaldier, E., 1984, Carnap’s Early Conventionalism: An Inquiry into the Historical 
Background of the Vienna Circle, Amsterdam, Rodopi. 
Russell, B., 1994(1914), The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics, in Mysticism and Logic, 
London, Routledge and Kegan, 140 – 172. 
Russell, B., 2005(1914), Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific 
Method in Philosophy, London and New York, Routledge. 
Schnädelbach, H., 1984, Philosophy in Germany 1831 – 1933, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Skidelsky, E., 2008, Ernst Cassirer. The Last Philosopher of Culture, Princeton and 
Oxford, Princeton University Press.  
Stern, F., 1989(1961), The Politics of Cultural Despair. A Study in the Rise of Germanic 
Ideology, Berkeley, University of California Press. 
Tennant, N., 1987, The Life and Work of the Early Carnap, in N. Rescher (ed.), Scienti-
fic Inquiry in Philosophical Perspective, University Press of America, 261 – 280. 
Tsou, J., 2003, The Justification of Concepts in Carnap’s Aufbau, Philosophy of Science 
70, 671 – 89. 
Uebel, T., 2008, „BLUBO-Metaphysik“: Die Verwerfung der Werttheorie des Südwest-
deutschen Neukantianismus durch Carnap und Neurath, in A. Siegetsleitner (Hrg.), Lo-
gischer Empirismus, Werte und Moral, Eine Neubewertung, Springer, Wien, 103 – 129. 
Vaihinger, H., 19206, Die Philosophie des Als Ob. Ein System der theoretischen, prak-
tischen und religiösen Fiktionen der Menschheit, Leipzig, Felix Meiner Verlag. 
Weber, M., 1909, „Energetische“ Kulturtheorien, in Max Weber (1968), 400 – 426. 
Weber, M., 1919, Wissenschaft als Beruf, in Max Weber (1968), 582 – 613. 
  33 
Weber, M., 1968, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, Dritte, erweiterte und 
verbesserte Auflage, herausgegeben von J. Winckelmann, Tübingen, J.C. B. Mohr (Paul 
Siebeck). 
Werner, M.G., 2003, Moderne in der Provinz. Kulturelle Experimente im Fin de Siècle 
Jena, Göttingen, Wallstein Verlag. 
Wolin, R., 2001, Heidegger’s Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and 
Herbert Marcuse, Princeton and Oxoford, Princeton University Press.  
Wolin, R., 2006, The Seduction of Unreason. The Intellectual Romance with Fascism, 
From Nietzsche to Postmodernism, Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press.  
Ziche, P., 2014, Theories of Order in Carnap’s Aufbau (this volume). 
Ziehen, T. 1913, Erkenntnistheorie auf psychophysiologischer und physikalischer Grund-
lage, Jena, Verlag von Gustav Fischer. 
 
